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Abstract
The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was conceived to protect the privacy
of individual citizens and manage the movement of personal data. The Smart Grid has the same
needs as any privacy-critical system and, compared to the engineering of other architectures,
has the peculiarity of being the source of the energy consumption data, which is an indirect
means to infer other personal information with potential professional or commercial value. This
work looks at the Smart Grid from the perspective of the GDPR, which is especially relevant
now given the current growth and diversification of the Smart Grid ecosystem. We contribute a
review of existing works showing the importance of energy consumption as valuable personal
data, an analysis of the established Smart Grid Architecture Model regarding GDPR compliance,
and a list of technical and legal challenges where we can highlight the challenge of managing
the data processing by third parties.
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1. Introduction
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is in application since the 25th May 2018 to
ensure the protection of individuals’ rights of citizens regarding their personal data, and imposes
legal obligations for the movement of such data both inside and outside of the European Union.
GDPR is conceived on top of “the respect for private and family life and home”1, and the
definition of personal data includes the factors related to the “physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of natural persons” (Art. 4(1) of the GDPR).
Our focus is on the Smart Grid, a large ecosystem of hardware- and software-intensive sys-
tems with a large diversity of stakeholders. The Smart Grid is a world-wide challenge towards a
more reliable, efficient and sustainable electrical grid. The times of manually reading or recon-
figuring the electricity meter are gone and electricity distributors and suppliers are experiencing
profound changes. Smart Meters automatically register and transmit the data through the Power
Line Carrier (PLC) or wireless connections to data concentrators and central systems using Me-
ter Data Management (MDM) Systems. Also, several services can be remotely applied such as
changing the pricing policy or activating or deactivating the electrical service.
1Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. Privacy and data protection are both
recognised as fundamental rights.
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All the stakeholders in the value chain can benefit from the Smart Grid: End users are
empowered through near real-time information (24 hours per day, 7 days a week) that they can
use to adjust their consumption or to identify a more appropriate pricing policy. Suppliers can
perform profiling and provide innovative and personalized pricing policies that can be beneficial
to avoid consumption peaks or waste of energy [42]. Distributors have an effective tool to better
monitor and manage their networks. In addition, smart metering promises to enable “prosumers”
(both producers and consumers of energy) to be more easily rewarded for their contribution. The
market around the Smart Grid includes big companies but also SMEs acting as distributors or
suppliers as well as a dynamic ecosystem of third-parties providing value-added services.
Data processed in a Smart Meter includes more than one thousand parameters and metrics
such as the quality of the signal, but the main one is the electricity consumption which is trans-
mitted at very small intervals of time. Prior to establishing the Smart Grid, the consumption was
measured approximately each month. The privacy-related issues mainly arise now when instan-
taneous data can be taken. Energy consumption can be used for guessing the data subject habits,
creating a personal behaviour profile, deducing personal and socioeconomic information, listing
the existing electrical equipment and monitoring their usage, or guessing the presence, absence
or current activity of the residents [4] [40]. Therefore, energy consumption measurements can
be considered personal data providing information of an “identifiable natural person” (Art. 4 (1)
of the GDPR) with great potential to be processed, solely or in combination with other data, for
“professional or commercial activities” ((18) of the GDPR). Exploiting behavioral data through
the Smart Grid can be motivated mainly by financial or political reasons [25].
Other personal data such as the address, contact details, bank accounts etc. can be found
in the Smart Grid context. However, these mainly appear in administrative or organizational
processes such as the billing process of distributors, suppliers and third parties. These cases fall
in the general category of privacy challenges for information technology services. The aspect
that makes the Smart Grid special regarding privacy concerns is the energy consumption, the
possibility to associate it with a data subject, and the consequences of disclosing these personal
data or its usage without explicit consent.
The methodology of this work consisted on several iterations to create and refine the con-
tent with Smart Grid and GDPR experts (both researchers and practitioners) from the European
PDP4E project consortium (Methods and tools for GDPR compliance through Privacy and Data
Protection Engineering) [33], the Digital Lab, the Digital Energy, and the Digital Trust Tech-
nologies area at Tecnalia, as well as legal experts from the KU Leuven Centre for IT & IP Law,
along with a literature review using the snowballing approach [41].
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents background information. Then, Sec-
tion 3 presents our analysis of the Smart Grid Architecture Model regarding GDPR. Section 4
presents the challenges. Finally, Section 5 concludes this work and outlines future work.
2. Background on the Smart Grid
In this section, we provide background information on electricity consumption data, and the
state-of-the-practice regarding widely accepted conceptual frameworks and the normative spaces
governing the Smart Grid context.
2.1. Frequent data of electricity consumption
Figure 1. Illustration of a time series of elec-
tricity consumption (Source: [13])
Electricity consumption is usually represented as a
time series where time is presented in the horizon-
tal axis and the energy consumption (in watts) is
presented in the vertical axis. The shape of the time
series will be then defined based on the appliances
used, or not used, in the daily lives of the residents.
Several techniques for time series analysis can be
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performed such as time series classification or forecasting [24]. A taxonomy of Smart Me-
ter data analytics is available [40]. Figure 1 is an illustrative example of a time series from the
Google Power Meter project (discontinued in 2011) [13] which, once integrated with Smart Me-
ters and with the appropriate consent, allowed users to record and visualise their own electricity
consumption. We can observe how load signatures (e.g., dryer, fridge etc.) can be identified.
The simultaneous use of several appliances can make it difficult to automatically analyse
time series (e.g., accumulative effect of energy consumption). However, this effect can be min-
imized if the load signatures were isolated at some point in time or through approximation
techniques. A review by Wang et al. [40] of Smart Meter Data Analytics presents different
applications of this data, and ten open data sets of Smart Meter data.
2.2. The Smart Grid Architecture Model
The Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) [3] is a reference framework widely adopted by
the Smart Grid community. Figure 2 is the representation of the SGAM that helps to position
Smart Grid actors and use cases in a three-dimensional space of:
• Domains (Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Distributed Electrical Resources (DER)
and Customer Premises),
• Zones (Process, Field, Station, Operation, Enterprise and Market), and
• Interoperability layers (Component, Communication, Information, Function and Busi-
ness).
Figure 2. Smart Grid Architecture Model (Source: [3])
As mentioned in Section 1,
Smart Meters have drastically
changed this industry, notably, the
SGAM Information and Commu-
nication layers have now much
more importance compared to
the era when the meters were
not highly and continuously con-
nected. Relatively speaking, these
two layers are not yet completely
mature, so crosscutting concerns
such as security had inevitably
gain relevance.
2.3. Normative spaces
The International Electrotechnical Commission created and maintains a standards map [18] us-
ing the SGAM as the reference conceptual framework. It currently contains information about
512 standards categorized in 16 component-related clusters. In addition, for each component,
several use cases and examples are included. The standards map identifies 4 crosscutting func-
tions: Telecommunication, Security, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), and Power Quality.
Another crosscutting aspect related to security is privacy which is the focus of this work.
The European Smart Grids Task Force Expert Group for Standards and Interoperability
presents My Energy Data [12] as services which are subject to the GDPR. They also analyse
the diversity of Smart Grid setups in different countries with respect to privacy. Our aim is to
provide a general view without a special focus on country specificity. The Smart Grid Task Force
also provides guidance for conducting Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) through the Data Pro-
tection Impact Assessment Template for Smart Grid and Smart Metering systems [11]. A survey
on standards related to privacy in the Smart Grid identifies ten standards [23]. The two of high
relevance are NISTIR 7628 [31, 32], and NIST SP 800-53 [29]. NISTIR 7628 is also mentioned
in the Task Force of Privacy and Security approach at the Smart Meters Co-ordination Group as
the reference for security requirements for device access control and message protection.
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3. Natural persons identifiers and energy consumption through the SGAM layers
This section presents an analysis of how the identifier of the data subject and its energy con-
sumption is propagated through the technical infrastructure and stakeholders of the Smart Grid.
3.1. Component and Communication layers
Figure 3 illustrates the Component and Communication layers of the SGAM. The Smart Meter
device (bottom right) usually transfers data through the Power Line Carrier (PLC) to a Distribu-
tion Data Collector (DDC). PLC is used in some countries such as France, Spain or Italy. Others
like UK or USA use wireless communications, sometimes using DDCs but others not. These
DDC concentrators installed in the secondary substations, usually one per neighbourhood, are
the intermediary points in the transmission to the distributor Head End System (HES) for around
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Figure 3. Component and Communication layers of the Smart
Grid Architecture
PLC does not perform well
in data transmission for long dis-
tances, thus, in case of remote
locations, more expensive solu-
tions should be put in place such
as Point-to-Point (P2P) protocols
to send the data directly to the
HES without the need of DDCs.
To communicate with the HES,
the DDC might use PLC, Gen-
eral Packet Radio Service (GPRS),
other radio protocols, Digital Sub-
scriber Lines (xDSL) or Fiber Op-
tics. The HES communicates with
the Distribution Management Sys-
tem (DMS) to receive the aggre-
gated reports. Approximately, a
DMS exists at national scale for
each distributor. Then, already in
the Enterprise SGAM zone, the
DMS communicates with the Cus-
tomer Relationship Management
(CRM) system. The CRM system is responsible to manage and analyze the interactions with the
customers. The CRM communicates with the Meter Data Management System (MDMS) of the
electric distributor. This MDMS is responsible to store, manage, and analyse the vast amount of
data generated in the Smart Grid. For more details we refer to a survey on Advanced Metering
infrastructures [28]. A huge variety of other systems, that do not belong to the traditional dis-
tributor and supplier actors of the SGAM, appear as third parties completing the ecosystem. The
MDMS can communicate with these third parties to enable or complement third-party services.
Regarding the communication, the data is encrypted (e.g., AES 128 [27]) and Smart Meter
devices that transmit unencrypted data are being replaced. The arrows in Figure 3 are bidirec-
tional because central systems can remotely monitor and operate in the Smart Meter through
these protocols (e.g., to respond to customer requests in real-time, to change date/hour, to mod-
ify the tariff or power demand threshold). In Figure 3, close to the Smart Meter device, the
auxiliary equipment is another possible component which might directly communicate with the
MDMS or with third parties. For instance, in the UK, the communication from the Smart Me-
ter auxiliary equipment with the supplier is direct through radio, replacing the need of DDCs,
HES etc. Also, electricity users can decide and consent to add auxiliary equipment to enable
third-party services. This way, third parties can obtain the data without the electric distributor.
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3.2. Information layer
Figure 4 illustrates the SGAM Information layer. The Smart Meter contains the customer’s
supply identifier. Several identifiers can be used to link a data subject with its electrical con-
sumption, the Smart Meter serial number (unique identifier assigned to the individual piece of
hardware), MAC address (Media Access Control address, a unique identifier used as a network
address for the data link layer), and the CUPs (Universal Supply Point Code) which is a unique
identifier for each home or business electricity supply point which does not change in case of
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Figure 4. Information layer of the Smart Grid
Architecture focused on the supply identifier
and the energy consumption
From the Field SGAM zone where the
Smart Meter is located, the information moves
to the Station and Operation zones where the
identifiers and energy consumption data is ag-
gregated with those of other users. Then, at the
Enterprise zone, as part of the billing process,
both the distributor and the supplier have the
customers’ physical address, the energy con-
sumption metrics, and the smart meter identi-
fier. Distributors and suppliers process personal
data and they might transmit this information
to third parties. As we can observe, the infor-
mation transverses several SGAM zones, com-
plicating the data lineage (term used to des-
ignate the management and traceability of the
data life-cycle). Figure 4 shows a coarse gran-
ularity of the information flow. The presented
steps could be largely expanded using more de-
tailed Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) with privacy-
related information (e.g., [5]) on specific organizational and technological settings. However,
the presented information is sufficient for the understanding of the challenges.
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Figure 5. Functional and Business layers of the
Smart Grid Architecture showing an excerpt
of the possible functions and the GDPR as
business normative space
Figure 5 illustrates the Function and Business
layers, showing only an excerpt of all the pos-
sible functions. The data processing by the
distributor or the supplier is a function related
to business purposes or to improve the qual-
ity of service. The customer examining his or
her consumption is also an example of function
from the Customer Premises domain. Then,
the data processing by third parties is a generic
function referring to the diversity of current
and future functions that will be available us-
ing Smart Grid information beyond distributors
and suppliers.
A Spanish study on the access to the electric
power consumption of Smart Meters and its ac-
cess and usage by third parties [35], lists more
than forty companies offering services from
power consumption data. Some of them use the
Smart Meter from the distributor/supplier, while
others offer submetering, which means the use
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of their own auxiliary equipment as mentioned in Section 3.1.
Other third parties can be related to the Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. The IoT paradigm
extends physical devices and traditional real-life objects with Internet connectivity, sensors to
get information about their context, and with the capacity to communicate and interact with
other devices and objects to provide services. These dynamic IoT networks and the use of
power consumption data are intended to unleash the promises of the Smart House or the Smart
City [43]. IoT also complicates the data lineage and the use of privacy technologies, given the
heterogeneity, potential mobility, and usually limited resources of IoT devices and objects [1].
As we have explained in Section 2.3, several normative spaces are placed in the different
SGAM domains and zones [18], and privacy is a topic that transverses SGAM. The SGAM
business layer also includes normative spaces, so we included the GDPR spanning all zones and
domains, except the electricity generation and transmission domains, as they are unrelated to
individuals. Other privacy-related normative spaces [23] will be similarly positioned.
4. Challenges
We categorized the identified Smart Grid challenges using the GDPR concepts that they belong
to. Section 4.1 refers to the principles relating to processing of personal data, Section 4.2 elabo-
rates on the rights of the data subject and finally, Section 4.3 presents the challenges linked with
the obligations of controllers and processors. The controller is the GDPR entity determining the
processing purposes and means, and who delegates the processing to the processor.
4.1. Principles relating to processing of personal data
Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
The GDPR requires controllers to process personal data in a lawful manner. It entails the
need for either a legal basis, such as the existence of a contract, a legal obligation or legitimate
interests, or the data subject’s consent. Art. 6 of the GDPR provides the full list of possible
legal grounds. In the Smart Grid scenario two potential legal grounds for the data processing
are identified as the most relevant: consent and contract. The performance of a contract could,
for instance, be used for the data processing necessary for the billing aspect. However, the use
for marketing purposes of the data of smart grid users will quite arguable require the consent
of the data subject. In all those cases the data should be collected and processed for a specific
purpose and, prior to processing, the controller should opt for the most suitable lawful ground.
If there are any additional purposes of processing, a controller should obtain a separate specific
and informed consent from a data subject for each of them, where processing is consent based.
Smart Meter users can currently volunteer and give their consent to be monitored to receive
marketing offers from suppliers or be informed about the pricing policy. Even though the trans-
mission of the personal data to third parties can contribute to the provision of extended services
or to more targeted marketing offers, the data subject shall be informed of all the recipients of
his or her personal data and, where required, explicitly give their consent. Such consent can
be considered freely given only if it can be as easily withdrawn as it was granted. While the
Smart Grid was conceived as a new field for the launch of innovative value-added services and
improvement of the sustainability of our environment, the management of the consent and han-
dling of its withdrawal, where data is transmitted across the SGAM actors and to third parties,
might encounter certain technical difficulties.
Data minimisation and purpose limitation
Since data minimisation and purpose limitation constitute the core GDPR principles, the
personal data provided should be limited to what is strictly necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they are processed, for instance for the performance of the contract, and for the sup-
ply and billing purposes. Thus, the controller must guarantee that third-party processors have
the minimal amount of data to perform their intended processing. In contrast to other scenarios
where this usually consists in not transmitting some columns from a database, the data minimisa-
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tion of the energy consumption is different and requires manipulating the time series in different
ways. A usual technique is to modify the resolution of the data. For example, the data with a
time interval of seconds might not be needed, but maybe only each hour or just the global for a
whole day or week. Some works suggest that a half-an-hour frequency is sufficiently reliable for
most purposes [14], while hiding the operation states of most of the appliances. Several works
also explore the trade-offs between privacy and the needs of Smart Grid data mainly by inves-
tigating different data resolution schemes and load shaping [6, 21, 37, 38, 2], but this research
field is still considered to have many open challenges. In fact, the Smart Grid data minimisation
is a well-studied case study for the more general problem of time series compression [7].
Data minimisation could be also performed in early phases (e.g., in the Smart Meter) con-
sidering the needs of processing in the whole chain for which the data subject gave his or her
consent. Failing to guarantee data minimisation, on top of being non-compliant with the GDPR
and thus exposing the controllers to fines, could have the consequence that users start adopting
techniques to preserve their privacy. Known techniques are charging and discharging batter-
ies [36] or the use of load shaping with storage and distributed renewable energy sources [21].
Special categories of data
While weather conditions stay a typical influential factor in predicting energy consumption,
data fusion can contribute to more effective Smart Grid data analysis. For example, personal en-
ergy consumption prediction and forecasting can be enhanced if other data sources are combined
with energy consumption histograms. The cumulative analysis of other data sources, containing
various information about a data subject (location, age, gender, socio-economic parameters like
the income level, employment status, educational level, whether they are property owners, the
number and type of appliances) can help to establish a correlation between electricity consump-
tion and habits. On the basis of precise energy consumption details some further assumptions
can be made with regard to more sensitive aspects of personal life, such as religious beliefs and
practices. According to Art. 9 of the GDPR the processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs etc. is prohibited (with spe-
cific exceptions). Whereas the intense analysis of multiple data sources can improve the quality
of services, it is crucial to strike the right balance between legitimate interests of controllers and
the fundamental right to protection of personal data. Several studies are trying to identify which
are the relevant variables that are worthy to use for the different analyses [16, 20, 26]. While
some of these data sources might be discarded, others might be highly valuable for providing
better or new services.
As mentioned before, energy consumption is a relevant information to satisfy the promises
of the IoT. This way, the devices can decide when to charge, operate, or shut down, to be more
cost and energy efficient. The automatic and unsupervised use of this data by the inter-connected
devices can be problematic. The Smart Meter can be an inter-connected actor providing energy
consumption measurements as well as other data such as the current pricing policy to other
actors. Though coordination mechanisms between machines can be established, devices might
disclose data or transfer data without consent (e.g., to the manufacturers). IoT manufacturers
are very diverse and it is not possible to control which devices will be part of this configurable
or self-configurable network at the design stage. Still they might need to transfer data between
them (e.g., to accomplish their mission or to provide better and more efficient services), with
the consequence of complicating the consent management for the data subjects each time a new
device is added. The interconnected devices should be able to negotiate, preferably without
human intervention, to make these networks efficient and self-managed. In addition, while
the Smart Meter might be related to the controller for the energy consumption and the energy
pricing policies, other IoT devices might be related to the controllers of other type of personal
data, which will need to be aggregated to provide new or enhanced services.
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4.2. Rights of the data subject
Right to information about processing operations
The right to information about processing operations is crucial for the exercise of all other
data subject’s rights. If customers of the Smart Grid are not informed about processing oper-
ations over their data at the time of its collection, they will never be aware of the use of their
personal data. The lack of information will prevent them from eventually taking further deci-
sions and actions (e.g., ask for its erasure). The GDPR stipulates that the controller shall take
all the appropriate measures to inform the data subject about processing related to his or her
personal data. This information shall include all the contact information about the controller,
the purposes of processing operations, their legal basis and also recipients of this personal data,
if any. The data subject shall be also informed if there are any intentions to transfer personal
data to third parties. This information shall be provided free of charge and without undue delay.
Since not all SGAM actors are known in advance, especially because of the dynamic ecosystem
of third parties, it might be difficult to manage the information obligation under the GDPR.
Right to access by the data subject and right to erasure
After a data subject’s request, it is technically challenging to guarantee the access (Art. 15
of the GDPR) and removal (Art. 17) of the energy consumption information from all the Smart
Grid actors. As in many other scenarios, the processing chain is complex, and coordinating the
processing actors and validating a complete access or removal might require advanced opera-
tions. While there is a legal permission to keep consumption data as it might be needed during
the billing process, there might be difficulties with managing and separating different data sets.
Therefore, the removal will have to take into account when, how and which data should be re-
moved from each processing party. In the context of third parties related to the IoT, there might
be connectivity issues that disconnects the controller from a device for long periods of time,
making difficult the actual and timely access and removal of the personal data.
Right to data portability
Art. 20 of the GDPR provides for the right to data portability. When a data subject wants
to change his or her electricity provider, the data portability must allow personal data to be
transferred directly to the new chosen company in a practical and simple way for the end user.
This might include the historic of energy consumption. Also, prior to the selection of a new
company as a supplier (initiated by the user), the new potential supplier might require to perform
an analysis of the personal data to identify the best personalised offer. This portability is a
transfer of the individual’s personal data for a specific objective where the data should be stored
for a short period of time before removal. There is the risk that companies try to hide the access
to personal data from other companies. To overcome this issue, a typification of consumption
profiles (e.g., standardizing a predefined list of profiles) would allow data minimisation.
The right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing
As set out in Art. 22(1) of the GDPR, the data subject shall have the right not to be subject
to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal
effects concerning him or her. The wording of this provision is not straightforward and may
create problems of interpretation. For instance, with regard to its scope of application. The
application of this provision to the Smart Grid scenario requires a detailed analysis of all the use
of personal data for profiling considerations. Moreover, there is a need to check whether a data
subject might be legally affected by any decisions taken without human intervention and based
solely on automated processing.
Profiling is probably the most direct use of the personal data regarding energy data con-
sumption, and highly-personalized marketing is its most obvious commercial use. One of the
main objectives of customized advertisement is to create personal profiles and cluster the pro-
files to maximize the probability of a successful commercial action. Apart from that, profiling
and monitoring could leave the door open to other kind of uses such as guessing user personal
information, or monitoring people for celebrity journalism. All these examples interfere with
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the right to privacy and the right to self-determination. In the Smart Grid scenario profiling can
meet the requirement of lawfulness if it is necessary for the performance of a contract between
the data subject and an electricity provider, or if it is based on the data subject’s explicit consent
as provided in Art. 22(2) of the GDPR.
Manufacturers are interested in knowing how people use their appliances. Each appliance
has an electricity load signature which can be used to differentiate its shape from other appli-
ances. For example, in Figure 1 we observed a peak corresponding to a dryer, and smaller and
periodic peaks corresponding to a fridge. If the appliance can be configured by the user or if
the circumstances change, this signature can be modified to some extent. Thus, it is possible
not only to know the existing appliances, but also how the residents use them. Newborough
and Augood [30] illustrated this fact by showing the difference in the load signatures of the
same washing machine using a 40◦C cycle and a 85◦C cycle. This practice of using energy
consumption and appliance load signatures for nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM), or non-
intrusive appliance load monitoring (NIALM) was already identified as problematic regarding
privacy when the technologies enabling it started to appear [17]. As another example of how
personal preferences can be obtained, automatic analysis of time series was used by Greveler et
al. [15] to show how the information about which TV channel is being watched can be disclosed
through Smart Meter power usage profiles. Given the brightness of the TV screen, a consump-
tion prediction model can be defined and used for each channel, and compared with the actual
consumption. This research concluded that a sample taken each 0.5 seconds during five minutes
is in many cases sufficient to identify the viewed content. Thus, the interests of a person can be
inferred through the viewed contents and used for professional or commercial purposes.
4.3. Obligations of controllers and processors
Data protection by design and by default and security of processing
According to Art. 24 and 32 of the GDPR, the controller and processor should implement all
the necessary technical and organisation measures in order to ensure the protection of personal
data and appropriate level of security. Moreover, in its Art. 25, the GDPR emphasises the princi-
ple of data protection by design and transforms it in a cornerstone obligation of the development
process. However, it is difficult to translate the legal rules in the GDPR into effective software
and technical mechanisms. Despite of this, the security of energy networks is closely inter-
twined with risks to the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy. The Smart Meters
constitute a part of a massive “attack surface” and are exposed to security failures. The TACIT
project [39] studied the different cyber-attacks that can take place in a Smart Grid scenario. As
electricity supply impacts other critical infrastructures, the cybersecurity threat to the energy
sector has an effect on the whole society. Addressing data protection considerations from the
design of the meters, and from all the SGAM levels, can contribute to a stronger cybersecurity.
Cyber-attacks have caused important problems for the energy sector, and the European
Union has tried to address the issue with the Network and Information Security (NIS) Direc-
tive [10] that increases the harmonization of national laws of Member states. However, since
the directive requires the transposition into national laws, some discrepancies will still remain.
While the directive also applies to the energy sector and contains in its annex a list of energy sec-
tor organisations that could be considered as operators of essential services, it does not specify
the appropriate measures and risk mitigation strategies that should be taken in order to reinforce
security. According to Art. 4(1) of the NIS Directive, a risk is “any reasonably identifiable cir-
cumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on the security of network and information
systems”. Therefore, energy providers should implement a threat and risk management system,
establish an effective incident response network, improve resilience to cyber-attacks and ensure
technical and human intervention in order to address such issues [8]. Moreover, the European
Commission has provided the Smart Grid industry with recommendations on how to address
such risk impact assessments [11].
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Convergent security analysis (physical and digital) is needed to guarantee the security of
processing of personal data as referred to in Art. 32 of the GDPR. NIST [31] refers to it as
combined cyber-physical attacks, and they can affect also privacy concerns. Smart Meters are
usually located in a shared place for several apartments. As examples of security threats on a
Smart Grid scenario, we can mention physically accessing the Smart Meter, watching the visible
display with the counter, observing the residence or identifying the names in the post boxes.
These are actions that can reveal the mapping between energy consumption and the associated
person. Less populated areas present more technical problems regarding these threats. Smart
Meters do not need visible displays, but they are equipped with them. They usually include a
LED which blinks more when the power consumption is higher. This could be used, not only to
guess the power consumption, but also to associate a Smart Meter with a person if we can link
the physical observation of the residence with the visible displays or the blinking of the LED for
singling out an apartment. While this kind of activity seems to be more related to sophisticated
preparation of criminal activities, their usage for professional or commercial purposes might
not be discarded. Also, the operators from the distributor or the supplier have access to various
personal information, so privacy adherence by operating personnel must be guaranteed.
Even if the Smart Meters themselves are fully compliant with the law, their connection to
other devices makes them more vulnerable. Vulnerability is exacerbated by the low security
standards implemented on some IoT devices [1], so manufacturers should provide for stronger
safeguards from the design stage. Recall that controllers are obliged to choose manufacturers
that provide for privacy-friendly solutions. Personal data within IoT devices can be available
to persons that are not authorized for it, and without the consent of the data subject. Also,
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [34] are highly present in the Smart Grid, and it is considered
that security and privacy are hindering the development of CPS in the Smart Grid context since
user actions can be monitored or devised from the data that CPS manage [19].
Data breach management
Apart from data breaches that can happen in any information system, there is a special as-
pect of the Smart Grid. This is related to the fact that energy availability might have more
priority than data subject privacy. Under the condition that such measures are proportionate and
transparent, public safety will often overrule protection of personal data. For example, Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks (e.g., sending large amounts of data so that the device is overloaded
and it is incapable of answering legitimate requests) have more priority than Man in the mid-
dle/Sniffing and intrusion to the servers [39]. DoS has higher priority because the availability of
electricity is safety-critical. Safety-critical systems are those whose failure can cause injury or
death to people or harm to the environment in which they operate [22]. In other scenarios such
as a non-critical web page providing some service, a data breach can be stopped by shutting
down the service until the security patch is in place. In the Smart Grid, shutting down the avail-
ability of electricity can have uncontrolled or catastrophic consequences (e.g., hospitals or other
critical infrastructures connected to the Smart Grid might be affected). The trade-offs between
disclosing personal data or cutting off the electricity should be investigated with appropriate
risk assessments (e.g., the Data Protection Impact Assessment mentioned in the GDPR). In a
hypothetical case of a data breach, a higher priority may be given to the availability of the ser-
vice. Microgrid operations or islanding (autonomously providing power to a location without
being connected to the main electrical grid) is being investigated to mitigate cyber-attacks and
cascading effects [9, 31]. Additionally, operators are asked to report incidents that affect the se-
curity, integrity and confidentiality of the service, if such incidents have a significant disruptive
effect on the provision of an essential service. Regarding personal data disclosure, the impact on
data subjects will need to be assessed, and data subjects or authorities will need to be informed
depending on the risk assessment and the severity of the risk.
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5. Conclusions
We analyzed the relation between the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Smart
Grid to present a characterization of the Smart Grid layers with respect to the GDPR, as well
as a description of the Smart Grid challenges with respect to GDPR concepts and principles.
The distributor and supplier are not the only affected actors, but also the growing and diverse
ecosystem of third parties providing extra services. The challenges include the large amounts
of information that can be obtained from the Smart Meter giving precise profiles of individual
citizens, the assurance and minimization of the data flows, as well as the consent management
before transmitting personal data to third parties. In the Smart Grid scenario, profiling is ex-
tended to larger proportions since one can single out what the person is doing every hour of the
day. This is an important interference to the right to data protection, the right to privacy and
the right to self-determination. As further work, Smart Grid challenges will be addressed at
technical level, by providing tools and methods that can help to evidence GDPR compliance.
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